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THE BUREAUCRATIC TAKEOVER OF CRIMINAL
SENTENCING
Maimon Schwarzschild*

I. INTRODUCTION
A tendency towards more bureaucracy is notable in various public and
private American institutions in recent times. The courts have not been immune to
this trend. Perhaps the most interesting and almost certainly the most consequential
rise of bureaucracy over the courts in the past quarter century has been the transfer
of power and discretion over criminal sentencing from federal judges to a
bureaucratic sentencing commission. If only as a dramatic instance of growing
regulatory power at the expense of the judiciary, it is worth considering how this
happened, why it happened, what the legal consequences for the criminal justice
system have been, and what are the social circumstances that help account for what
happened.
II. SENTENCING BEFORE SENTENCING REFORM
Throughout American history, until just fifteen years or so before the end
of the twentieth century, judges—especially federal judges—had very substantial
discretion over criminal sentencing.1 It was relatively rare for criminal statutes in the
United States even to stipulate a minimum prison sentence upon conviction.2 A
typical statue provided only a maximum: “no more than fifteen years” for example.
Judges had power and discretion to impose any sentence—ranging from probation
or no prison sentence at all, up to a maximum prison term fixed by the criminal
statute under which the offender was convicted.3
American sentencing policy reflected a variety of theories or justifications
for criminal punishment: the deontological principle of “just deserts”4—although
non-academics would hardly use the word “deontological”—and the utilitarian or

* Professor of Law, University of San Diego; Affiliated Professor, University of Haifa. Thanks to
Ryan Cannon for research help.
1. Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Judging Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 91 NW. U. L.
REV. 1247, 1248 (1997).
2. KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS 9 (1998) (noting that, historically, the majority of federal criminal statutes stipulated
only a maximum term of years and a maximum monetary fine).
3. Id. at 19.
4. Brian Forst & Charles Wellford, Punishment and Sentencing: Developing Sentencing Guidelines
Empirically from Principles of Punishment, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 799, 80204 (1981).
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consequentialist principles of general and specific deterrence,5 incapacitation,6 and
rehabilitation.7 For most of the twentieth century, pride of place went to
rehabilitation, at least rhetorically, in legislative and authoritative public statements
about the goal of imprisonment.8 But legislation did not impose any clear
criminological theory on judges, and judges—both at the federal and state levels—
were overwhelmingly free to sentence in accordance with one or other, or a
combination, or (most often) no explicit governing philosophy of punishment.
Judges were free and responsible, that is, to impose a just sentence, as best the judge
could judge, taking into account the circumstances, the characteristics of the
particular offence and of the offender in each case.
That is not to say that the sentencing judge, or even the judiciary, had
exclusive power over the punishment that would actually be inflicted. Federal judges
commonly imposed “indeterminate sentences” during most of the 20th century: a
prison sentence would be “up to” a stated period of years (or months), equal or less
than the statutory maximum for the offense.9 This was in accordance with the
rehabilitative ideal.10 The theory was that the prisoner would be considered for
parole, and released from prison, once the prisoner was rehabilitated (or was deemed
to be).11 A federal prisoner was eligible for parole, for example, after serving onethird of his or her sentence.12 The parole decision was in the hands of an
administrative Parole Commission, not the court.13 On average, federal prisoners
actually served approximately sixty percent of the maximum to which they were
sentenced.14 Judges were well aware of all this, of course, and could take it into
account in deciding upon a sentence.15

5. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 14 (defining general deterrence as the discouraging of others
from committing crimes, and specific deterrence as “discourag[ing] the defendant from committing more
crimes”) (emphasis added).
6. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 14 (noting that criminal sanctions have the incapacitating
effect of protecting others by removing the offender from the general population).
7. Derek Neal & Armin Rick, The Prison Boom and Sentencing Policy, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2
(2016) (noting that the indeterminate-sentencing model was meant to promote rehabilitation—providing
incentives for “good behavior and self-improvement”).
8. See Crystal S. Yang, Have Interjudge Sentencing Disparities Increased in an Advisory
Guidelines Regime? Evidence from Booker, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1268, 1280 (2014).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 17.
12. See Stith & Cabranes, supra note 1.
13. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, Crime & Delinquency: Sentencing Reforms in Historical Perspective
631, 637 (Anne Newton, 1983).
14. See Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing: An Assessment of How Well the Federal Criminal
Justice System is Achieving the Goals of Sentencing Reform, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 45 (Nov. 2004),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-andsurveys/miscellaneous/15-year-study/15_year_study_full.pdf.
15. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 19.
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The Sentencing Reform Movement

This entire approach to criminal sentencing was challenged—with growing
political resonance—during the 1970s and early 1980s, for essentially three very
different reasons and from at least two very different ideological points of view.16
The first objection was that sentencing was arbitrary and depended on the
whim, or at least upon the predilections or prejudices, of the judge who happened to
be assigned to a case.17 Your judge might be “Cut ‘em-loose Bruce”—alluding to an
actual New York State judge named Bruce Wright, who claimed that he should
instead be nicknamed “Civil” Wright;18 or your judge might instead be “Maximum
John”—the sobriquet of John Sirica, the federal judge who (righteously or selfrighteously, depending on your point of view) helped bring down President Richard
Nixon.19 A leading critic of this “judicial lottery” was Marvin Frankel, himself a
federal judge,20 who denounced the “unruliness” and the “unbridled power” of
judges as “terrifying and intolerable” and called for a sentencing commission that
would provide a “chart or calculus” to rein in judicial discretion over sentencing.21
A second objection came essentially from civil rights advocates, who were
concerned that judicial discretion enabled unfavorable bias against minority and poor
defendants.22 It was this concern—from the political Left—that prompted Senator
Edward M. Kennedy to take up the cause of sentencing reform with the aim of
reducing judicial discretion over criminal sentencing.23
A third objection came instead from the political Right: from critics of
judicial leniency who urged that judges—federal judges in particular—were failing
or refusing to sentence severely enough, and hence failing adequately to deter and
punish crime,24 at a time when crime and disorder had grown rapidly during the later
1960s and 1970s.25
These disparate political forces, usually so much at odds with one another,
came together in Congress and led to the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984, sponsored by Senator Kennedy.26

16. See Frank O. Bowman III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled American Sentencing
Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 367, 374, 37677 (2010).
17. See Yang, supra note 8, at 1281.
18. See Marc Galanter, Frank S. Palen, & John M. Thomas, The Crusading Judge: Judicial Activism
in Trial Courts, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 699, 729–30 (1979); Peter Kihss, Judge Wright Terms His Attack on
Officers Possibly ‘Excessive,’ N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1979, at B8.
19. See Robert L. Jackson, John J. Sirica, Watergate Case Judge, Dies at 88, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 15,
1992), http://articles.latimes.com/1992-08-15/news/mn-4868_1_watergate-scandal.
20. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 35.
21. Marvin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order 5, 49, 113–14 (1973).
22. See Yang, supra note 8, at 1281.
23. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 38–43.
24. See Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 1233, 1247 (2005).
25. Bowman III, supra note 16, at 374.
26. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 43–48.
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The Federal Sentencing Guidelines

The Act created a United States Sentencing Commission, with (eventually,
after the law was amended) seven members: three of them federal judges, and a staff
of about one hundred.27 The commission was empowered—and required—to issue
“sentencing guidelines” for the federal courts.28 The Commission declared (without
clear statutory authority) that these Guidelines were not what is usually meant by the
word “guidelines”; rather, that they were compulsorily binding on federal judges.29
The federal courts of appeals—and ultimately the Supreme Court of the United
States—undertook to enforce compliance by federal district judges, and enforce it
they did.30
The Guidelines were—and are—issued and subsequently amended by the
Commission without the procedural safeguards otherwise applicable to federal
administrative rulemaking. The Commission does not deliberate in open forum;31
there is no public notice-and-comment procedure;32 the Commission is not required
to provide rationales for new rules;33 and the rules themselves are not subject to
appeal or judicial review.34
The Guidelines are immensely detailed and “algebraic” in their application.
The centerpiece of the Guidelines is the Sentencing Table, or grid. It lists 43 “Offense
Levels” vertically, and 6 categories of “Criminal History” (i.e. number and
seriousness of past offenses) horizontally.35 The offense level for each criminal
offense is fixed by the guidelines, the level varying—levels added or subtracted—
for further circumstances specified in elaborate detail in the Guidelines. At the
27. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, An Overview of the United States Sentencing Commission 3 (2011),
http://isb.ussc.gov/files/USSC_Overview.pdf.
28. Yang, supra note 8, at 1269–71.
29. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 248 (1993). Initially, congressional
concerns over a mandatory guidelines regime were assuaged by language inserted into the original Senate
Bill that only required judges to “consider” a wide range of factors in fashioning sentences. Id. at 244.
However, a subsequent amendment to the Bill inserted a provision that also required judges to “impose a
sentence within the range [specified by the guidelines] unless the court finds that an aggravating or
mitigating circumstance exists that was not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines and that should result in a different sentence.” Id. at 245. The
Sentencing Commission then took it upon itself to determine the correct interpretation of the Bill’s
contradictory language, declaring the Guidelines mandatory and granting itself a great expansion of
power. See id. at 247–48.
30. See id. at 248 n.152 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court upheld the Guidelines as
constitutional and legally binding in Mistretta v. United States. 488 U.S. 361 (1989), (Scalia, J.
dissenting). See also Bowman III, supra note16, at 420 n.262 (“[F]or some years after the Guidelines were
promulgated, the Commission was often at odds with district judges as it sought to establish its authority.
In this early contest, the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals generally backed the Commission,
holding that the Guidelines were indeed legally binding.”).
31. See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 72 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1996).
32. Penal Populism, Sentencing Councils and Sentencing Policy 107–08 (Arie Freiberg & Karen
Gelb eds., 2014).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL 420
(2016), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/guidelines-manual/2016/GLMFull.pdf.
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intersection of the offense level and the criminal history category is a “box” with a
range of months-of-imprisonment, within which the judge must sentence the
convicted offender.36
The Sentencing Table alone does not begin to represent the complexity of
the Guidelines, which are as voluminous as the Internal Revenue Code (a byword for
impenetrable complexity).37 For example, the Guidelines reduce the offense level for
many offenses in case of “minor” participation in the offense, and more so for
“minimal” participation.38 These concepts are hazily defined, but it can make a great
difference to the sentence depending on whether participation is found to be “minor”
or “minimal.”39 Likewise, the offense level goes up for “leadership” or “managerial”
roles in the offense,40 the concepts once again being hazily defined.41 It can make a
great difference to the sentence depending upon whether the offender is found to
have exercised “leadership” or to have been “managerial.”42
1.

The Guidelines in Practice

The Guidelines thus substitute a regulatory scheme of sentencing,
elaborated in a very bureaucratic style, issued by a central administrative body and
applicable nationwide, in place of any individual moral confrontation between judge
and offender. The stated goal—or at least, one key goal—is equality and elimination
of disparities in sentencing.43 Another implicit goal is surely to reduce reliance on
the judgment of judges, themselves admittedly fallible human beings.
The Guidelines further reduce the “human element” in sentencing by
explicitly forbidding judges to consider such human factors as the offender’s
education and vocational skills,44 drug or alcohol dependence,45 youthful

36. See id.
37. SEE ROGER W. HAINES, JR., FRANK O. BOWMAN, III & JENNIFER C. WOLL, FEDERAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES HANDBOOK 18–20 (Nov. 2002 ed.).
38. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL 364 (2016).
39. See id. at 366. “Minimal participant” is defined as one who is “plainly among the least culpable
of those involved in the conduct of a group,” while “minor participant” is defined as one who is “less
culpable than most other participants in the criminal activity, but whose role could not be described as
minimal.”
40. Id. at 363.
41. See id. at 364. Rather than provide even general definitions for “leadership” or “managerial”
roles, the Guidelines instead specify a set of factors for the judge to consider when determining the
defendants role, including “exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the
commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits
of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the
illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others.” Id.
42. It is not left to the unreviewable – or deferentially reviewed – discretion of the trial judge to
decide whether the offender’s role was leadership or managerial, minimal or minor: rather, it is treated as
a question of law, reviewable as such. See Stith & Cabranes, supra note 1, at 1267. “Once the trial judge
renders a decision, the distinction between ‘minor’ and ‘minimal’ participation becomes the business of
the federal courts of appeals.” There were “869 [appellate] cases reported on this distinction alone” as of
September 1996. Id. at 1267 n.74.
43. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 31; Yang, supra note 8, at 1268.
44. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.2 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2016).
45. Id. § 5H1.4.
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upbringing,46 employment history,47 family ties and responsibilities,48 community
ties,49 and charitable acts (or lack thereof).50 Excluding these factors from
consideration opens the Guidelines to the charge that ‘[u]nder the Guidelines, judges
thus confront defendants as numbers rather than as human beings”,51 imposing a
“cookie-cutter” and even “Kafkaesque” approach.52 Yet permitting these
considerations would almost inevitably mean relying more on the discretion of the
sentencing judge, with the likelihood – indeed the virtual certainty – that different
judges would exercise that discretion differently even in similar cases.
The Guidelines, and the underlying Acts of Congress,53 took several further
steps which greatly changed the framework of federal penology. First, applicable
sentences were increased in severity.54 In principle, the Commission’s policy was to
survey sentences that had actually been imposed, as a guide to prison terms to be
stipulated in the Guidelines.55 But at many points, the Commission decided—
unreviewably of course56—that there should be longer, more severe terms of
imprisonment, and laid down such sentences accordingly.57 This was done in
particular for many “white collar” offences (thus pleasing the political Left, roughly
speaking) and for many drug offences (thus pleasing the political Right, roughly
speaking).58 It was done for many non-”white collar” and non-drug offenses as
well.59
46. Id. § 5H1.12.
47. Id. § 5H1.5.
48. Id. § 5H1.6.
49. See id.
50. Id. § 5H1.11. While age, mental and emotional condition (apart from legal insanity), physical
condition, and military and public service may be considered relevant when determining whether a
departure is warranted, they may only be considered if the characteristics, “individually or in combination
with other offender characteristics, [are] present to an unusual degree [such that they distinguish] the case
from the typical cases covered by the guidelines.” Id. § 5H1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.11
51. Erik Luna, Gridland: An Allegorical Critique of Federal Sentencing, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 25, 39 (2005).
52. Id. at 40.
53. See, e.g., Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984); PROTECT
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No.108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (including the “Feeney Amendment” restricting
“downward departures” from Guidelines sentences and abolishing appellate court deference to the
sentencing decisions of trial judges).
54. See J.C. Oleson, Blowing Out All the Candles: A Few Thoughts on the Twenty-Fifth Birthday of
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 45 U. Rich. L. Rev. 693, 709–14 (2011).
55. Id. at 709–10.
56. See Freiberg, supra note 32 and accompanying text.
57. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 59–66.
58. See Oleson, supra note 54, at 710–11.
59. See id. at 711. Guidelines sentences were set above historical levels, for example, for robbery,
murder, aggravated assault, immigration, as well as rape. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 14, at
47. To be fair, the trend toward more severe federal sentences has not been solely at the instance of the
Commission. Congress is responsible for much of the increase in prison terms in recent decades. New,
more rigorous minimum prison terms have been enacted for many offences, see, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)
(2010) (increasing the penalty range where specified amounts of drugs are involved); and imposing a
minimum and doubling the maximum sentence for drug offences committed within 1000 feet of schools,
colleges, playgrounds, public housing, etc. 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) (1994). Congress moreover enacts
“directives” to the Sentencing Commission, almost invariably calling for more severe sentences. See
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Second, parole was abolished in the federal system.60 Early release on
parole was no longer to be available to federal prisoners; to this day, there is no
possibility of parole for prisoners sentenced after 1987 when the Reform Act and the
Guidelines took effect.(A “good time” reduction of about fifteen percent of the
sentence is still available on the basis of good conduct in prison.)61
Third, the Guidelines originally called for “real offense” sentencing.62 This
meant that once a defendant is convicted—either by proof of the statutory elements
of an offense, or by a plea of guilty to those elements—the judge must take into
account other crimes or offenses “in the same course of conduct” and enhance the
sentence (i.e. make it more severe) accordingly. This applied even if the jury was
never confronted with any allegation of such conduct, nor the defendant in case of a
guilty plea.63 This “relevant conduct” needed not be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt: but only “more likely than not.”64 Indeed, the Supreme Court held that even
if the conduct was put to the jury as a separate count, and the jury acquitted the
defendant of it (but convicted him or her of a “related” offense), the sentence still
could and should be increased for it—often very substantially—just so long as the
judge found the conduct to have been proved “by a preponderance of the evidence.”65
Defense counsel must therefore advise a defendant charged with multiple “related”
counts that “if you choose to go to trial, you would have to convince the jury to acquit
you of all the charges, because if they convict you of a single count, even if they
acquit you of all the others, you can still be punished for all the charges”.
2.

The Booker Decision; Cutting Back the Guidelines to Mere
Guidelines; and Federal Sentencing Now

This third aspect of the Guidelines regime, namely real-offense sentencing,
led to a Supreme Court decision in 2005, United States v. Booker, which struck down
the mandatory status of the Guidelines and declared them “advisory” instead:66 the
Guidelines, one might say, now became guidelines. Under the mandatory regime(i.e.
from 1987 to 2005) an offender might have been convicted (or might have pleaded)
to an offense which would yield a sentence in a given “box” on the sentencing grid.
Since the Guidelines were mandatory, the maximum sentence in that “box” was, in
effect, the maximum legal sentence. Then the “real offense”— not found by a jury
or proved beyond a reasonable doubt— might put the offence in a new “box,” leading
to a sentence harsher than the maximum in the first “box.” The Supreme Court in

Jeffrey S. Parker & Michael K. Block, The Limits of Federal Criminal Sentencing Policy; or, Confessions
of Two Reformed Reformers, 9 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1001, 1023–24 (2001).
60. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 218(a)(4), 98 Stat. 1987, 2027 (1985)
(repealing the federal parole system).
61. See 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (2008). The 15 percent reduction is derived from the ability of a prisoner
to receive up to fifty-four “credit” days for each year they serve, with fifty-four days being roughly 15
percent of one year. Id.
62. See Bowman III, supra note 16, at 424.
63. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(a)(2)
(2016); Bowman III, supra note 16, at 424.
64. See Bowman III, supra note 16, at 424.
65. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997).
66. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259 (2005).
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Booker held it unconstitutional for the offender to receive a harsher sentence, for acts
not found by the jury or proved beyond a reasonable doubt (or confessed by guilty
plea), than the maximum which could otherwise have been imposed.67 The Court’s
solution was to render the Guidelines “advisory.”68 Judges must still take the
Guidelines into consideration, but are not legally bound by them.69 Now the statutory
maximum is the maximum provided in the criminal statute itself.70 (A punishment in
the Guidelines never exceeds the statutory maximum: in the lesser “box” it would
certainly be less than the statutory maximum.) In sum—putting an exceptionally
complex decision as briefly as possible—Booker cut away the mandatory force of
the Guidelines, at least in principle.
In the years since Booker, federal judges have largely continued to sentence
within the Guidelines, notwithstanding that they are now advisory, and
notwithstanding that a trial judge’s sentence—even a sentence non-compliant with
the Guidelines—is now seldom reversed on appeal.71 On average, the Sentencing
Commission has found that about eighty percent of post-Booker federal sentences
comply with the Guidelines.72 (There is some geographic variation in this: some
federal districts and circuits are more compliant than others, and there is variation
depending on the category of offence as well, but eighty percent is the nationwide
average.)73 The reasons for the relatively high degree of continued compliance are
open to speculation. Some judges might respect the Guidelines on their merits. Some
might feel that the Guidelines are a “safe harbor” against appeal and the risk of
reversal. For many, no doubt, complying with rules—or what seem like rules—is the
right thing to do. A regulatory system, once in place, achieves a kind of stickiness.
It is not readily displaced.
What is clear is that in the era of the Sentencing Commission and the
Guidelines—whether mandatory or advisory—the severity of the federal penal
system has increased dramatically. The number of inmates in the federal prisons rose
from about 25,000 in 1980 to over 205,000 in 2015.74 “The average . . . time served
by federal [prison] more than doubled from 1988 to 2012, . . . from 17.9 to 37.5
months.”75 Statutory minimum sentences, enacted by Congress during this era,

67. Id. at 232.
68. Id. at 259.
69. See id. at 264.
70. Id. at 232; Kate Stith, Principles, Pragmatism, and Politics: The Evolution of Washington State’s
Sentencing Guidelines, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 121 (2013).
71. Reversal seldom occurs because appellate court review of sentencing decisions is subject to the
deferential “abuse-of-discretion standard.” See Yang, supra note 8, at 1288, 1291 n.118.
72. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT ON THE CONTINUING IMPACT OF UNITED STATES V.
BOOKER ON FEDERAL SENTENCING (2012) https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/
congressional-testimony-and-reports/booker-reports/2012-booker/Part_A.pdf. But cf. Bowman III, supra
note 16, at 468 (calculating that as of 2009, federal sentences within Guidelines ranges were
approximately sixty percent of all federal sentences).
73. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 72, at 75–88.
74. Nathan James, Cong. Research Serv., R42937, The Federal Prison Population Buildup: Options
for Congress 1 (2016).
75. Prison Time Surges for Federal Inmates, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, Nov. 2015, at 1,
(citation omitted).
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especially for drug offences, account in part for the increases.76 Increased sentences
under the Guidelines, including a sharp cutback on the possibility of probation rather
than prison, and the abolition of parole altogether, account for much of the rest. There
has been an increase both in the proportion of federal offenders sentenced to prison,
and in the length of the prison sentences actually served.77
3.

Ceding Power over Sentencing

Whom have all these developments empowered at the expense of judges?
First, the United States Sentencing Commission: a centralized bureaucratic body
which fixes sentences (or rather, sentence ranges) without any personal encounter
with individual offenders or victims or their particular circumstances. When the
Sentencing Reform Act passed in 1984, creating the Commission and the Guidelines,
there was resistance from many federal district judges. In the half-decade after the
law was enacted, more than 200 district courts struck down all or part of the Act as
unconstitutional,78 and 179 district courts “invalidated the Guidelines” within one
year after they went into effect.79 But in 1989, these rulings were overturned by the
Supreme Court, which upheld the constitutionality of the Act, the Sentencing
Commission, and the compulsory force of the Guidelines.80
Second, the Probation Service, another body of civil servants. Until the
Guidelines era, probation officers would prepare a background report on each
convicted offender (unless the defendant waived the report): the judge would take
the report into account in considering whether to release the defendant on probation
rather than imposing a prison sentence.81 Under the Guidelines, the role of the
Probation Service was transformed. Now, the probation officer functions as an
independent fact-finder, settling a version of the offense—including “related”
offenses not charged or proved prior to conviction —and calculates the Guidelines
sentence.82 Defendants no longer have any power to waive the report.83 (Indeed,
“defense counsel have come to regard the probation officer as a second prosecutor,
whose purpose is to review and then raise the Guideline calculations” of the
prosecuting attorney.)84 Probation officers are commonly described as “guardians of
the guidelines.”85
Third, the prosecution. The severity of the Sentencing Guidelines, and of
many federal criminal statutes, give prosecutors leverage to negotiate—realistically,

76. Id.
77. Id. at 2–4.
78. See TONRY supra note 31.
79. See Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the
Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1337, 1403, 1435 (1998).
80. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374, 393, 397, 412 (1989) (with a lone dissent from
Justice Scalia).
81. See Stith & Cabranes, supra note 1, at 1248–51.
82. Id. at 1256–57.
83. Id. at 1257.
84. Id. at 1258.
85. Douglas A. Berman, Is Fact Bargaining Undermining the Sentencing Guidelines?, 8 FED.
SENT’G. RPTR. 300, 301 (1996).
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to compel—guilty pleas to lesser but often still very serious offenses.86 The
prosecutor also has the power to introduce new, “related,” offenses at sentencing,
which the prosecutor need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt (only “more likely
than not”) and which can increase the Guideline sentence significantly.87 There have
been cases of prosecution and conviction—or guilty plea—for robbery, then a
showing of (related) murder at sentencing, and a guidelines sentence accordingly;88
or prosecution for a small quantity of drugs, then a showing of a large quantity at
sentencing, with far harsher Guideline punishment accordingly.89 This prospect
gives prosecutors yet more leverage to extract guilty pleas, because of the lower
burden of proof at the sentencing phase than at actual trial . Further, the Guidelines
provide only one standard reason for imposing a lighter sentence than the Sentencing
Table otherwise requires: namely “that the defendant has provided substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed
an offense”—i.e. confession and giving evidence against confederates.90 (Pity the
defendant without information, or without confederates to betray!)91 Crucially, the
judge cannot find “substantial assistance” under the Guidelines unless the prosecutor
certifies it and moves for a lighter sentence.92 Altogether, if the power of federal
prosecutors is not boundless, it might fairly seem so to a defendant or to anyone
threatened with federal prosecution.
The rate of guilty pleas, accordingly, is now approximately ninety-seven
percent of all federal prosecutions.93 It was eighty-four percent in 1984, and around
seventy-five percent in 1977:94 still high, but not—before the Sentencing Reform
Act—virtually every case. Jury trials in criminal cases, once thought a bulwark of
Anglo-American liberty, are now exceedingly rare.

86. See Frank O. Bowman III, Fear of Law: Thoughts on Fear of Judging and the State of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 299, 343–46 (2000) (describing the process of “charge
bargaining”).
87. See id.
88. See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 140.
89. See Johan Bring & Colin Aitken, Burden of Proof and Estimation of Drug Quantities under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1987, 1989 (1997) (noting that drug quantity at
sentencing is the total quantity handled by the defendant—the “real offense”—rather than the amount
charged).
90. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL 482-83
(2016).
91. Leniency for “substantial assistance”, i.e. for turning on confederates, goes against consistency
in sentencing—the same punishment for the same offence—which is otherwise held out as a fundamental
goal and justification of the Guidelines regime. See United States v. Ives, 984 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1993)
(disparity of sentences among equally culpable co-defendants is no ground for objection to a sentence
prescribed by the Guidelines). The use of the substantial-assistance motion by prosecutors also differs
considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction—another factor against consistency. See Ilene H. Nagel &
Stephen J. Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 550 (1992).
92. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 2, at 123.
93. Mark Motivans, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Federal Justice Statistics, 2012 – Statistical Tables 17 (2015),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs12st.pdf.
94. GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN AMERICA
223 (2003).
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Sentencing and the Federal System

It should be remembered, of course, that in the division of labor and
jurisdiction between state and federal government in the United States, most criminal
prosecutions—and hence most criminal sentences—are in state courts, with
sentences served in state prisons. In 2016 there were about 1,317,565 inmates in state
prisons in the United States.95 With about 189,192 inmates in federal prison, this
means that some eighty-seven percent of American inmates are in state prisons.96
Traditionally, almost all criminal prosecution in America was under state law in state
court, and punishment in state prisons or jails. (Murder, rape, robbery, burglary and
more: all typically state offenses.) Until the second half, or final third, of the 20th
century, ninety-five percent or more of American criminal convictions were in state
court.97 The recent expansion of federal drug laws, and of federal criminal legislation
generally, has meant more federal prosecution and imprisonment. But the lion’s
share of ordinary criminal prosecution is still in state hands.
The growth in federal criminal law means that more crimes are now liable
either to federal or state prosecution. (In theory, although not usually in practice, this
makes the offender liable both to federal and state prosecution.) This is true of drug
crimes in particular. Typically, federal and state prosecutors come to an agreement
about which government—federal or state—will prosecute a given case.98 In general,
especially since the Guidelines went into effect, federal sentences are harsher—often
much harsher—than the state sentence for the same offense.99 (This is not true in
every case, but it is generally true: and especially so in drug cases.) If one
justification—probably the leading justification—for the Guidelines, and for the
bureaucratic centralization of federal sentencing, was concern about sentencing
discrepancies and a belief that equity requires uniformity, then the discrepancy
between federal and state punishment (a discrepancy which tends to increase, as
federal sentencing ratchets upward in severity) might seem to challenge the raisond’etre of the Guidelines regime.
D.

Sentencing Reform and Social Mistrust

The Sentencing Reform Act, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines—
whether they are formally compulsory or nominally advisory—represent an
extraordinary transfer of authority and power from federal trial judges to a
centralized and essentially non-judicial bureaucracy. It is worth considering what
95. E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRISONERS IN 2016 4 (2018) (rev. Aug 7, 2018)
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16.pdf.
96. Id.
97. E.g., MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS,
1998 1, (2001), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc98.pdf (noting that in 1998, state courts
accounted for ninety-five percent of felony convictions in the United States).
98. See, e.g., Lisa L. Miller & James Eisenstein, The Federal/State Criminal Prosecution Nexus: A
Case Study in Cooperation and Discretion, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 239, 240–41 (2005) (noting the
generally cooperative relationships between federal and state prosecutors).
99. See id. at 248. One of the most notable sentencing gaps is for firearms related charges which,
under the federal system, often receive mandatory minimum sentences that exceed the maximum sentences
permitted under state law. Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70
S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 674 (1997).
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social forces might underlie such a divestiture. Mistrust of federal judges was surely
animated on the one hand by the idea that judicial discretion invited abuse,
specifically that it invited improper discrimination, especially racial discrimination,
and this in an era of sharply heightened racial consciousness;100 it was animated on
the other hand by a widespread perception, both in Congress and among the public,
that lenient judges—personally insulated from the effects of rapidly increasing crime
and social breakdown—were failing to protect the public.101
More broadly, there has been erosion of trust in public institutions over the
past generation or two in America. There is reason to believe that this is a
consequence, in part, of the rapid evolution of American society in the direction of
heterogeneity, diversity, and group (or grievance-group) consciousness. Robert
Putnam, the Harvard political scientist—author of the well-known study of social
breakdown and isolation, “Bowling Alone”102—reluctantly concludes that social
heterogeneity in America does indeed erode public and private trust.103 This does
not, by itself, explain why power over criminal sentencing would be withdrawn from
judges and turned over to an unelected and essentially unaccountable regulatory
Commission. But when individual figures of authority, like judges, are increasingly
mistrusted, there is a tendency to place or misplace faith in bureaucracy instead, with
its attributes, real or imagined, of regularity, rationality, and impartiality.
E.

Conclusion: The Present and Future of Bureaucratic Sentencing

Since the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Booker,104 federal judges are
required to calculate and to consider Guidelines sentences, and the “gravitational
pull”105 of the Guidelines is such that most federal sentences still conform to the
Guidelines, but they are no longer legally obligatory. Perhaps this is a reasonable or
at least a tolerable compromise. The advocates of the Sentencing Reform Act, both
on the Left and on the Right, invoked serious considerations in favor of something
like the Guidelines regime, after all -- as do critics of bureaucratic power over
sentencing. The post-Booker settlement is not necessarily stable or permanent
however. Advocates of stricter control of judicial sentencing continue to be
concerned about sentencing disparities between judges, and about possible abuses of
judicial discretion so long as the Guidelines are less than mandatory.106 Members of
Congress have suggested that the obligatory force of the Guidelines should be
reinforced after Booker, and Judge William K. Sessions III, a former Chair of the
Sentencing Commission, has proposed legislation “resurrecting” the mandatory – or
“presumptive” – Guidelines. Sessions suggests various plausible ways that Congress

100. See Yang, supra note 8, at 1280–81.
101. See TONRY, supra note 31, at 89.
102. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY (2000).
103. See Robert D. Putnam, E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century,
30 SCANDINAVIAN POL. STUD. 137, 146–53 (2007).
104. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
105. Bowman III, supra note 16, at 468.
106. See, e.g., Yang, supra note 8 at 1274.
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could restore, at least largely, the compulsory force of the Guidelines without
violating the constitutional requirements laid down in Booker.107
Restoring the pre-Guidelines, pre-1984 approach to federal sentencing, on
the other hand, would therefore be unlikely at this point, and perhaps not a good idea.
Could bureaucratic control or influence over federal sentencing nonetheless be
reduced, at least to some degree? This would probably require less partisan division
in American society, less federalization of criminal law, or both. The case for
centralized regulation of criminal sentencing is especially strong if sentences differ
substantially–or seem to the public to do so–depending on the political party of the
judge. There is already evidence that “female judges and Democratic-appointed
judges issue shorter sentences and are more likely to depart downward from the
Guidelines after Booker, compared to their male and Republican-appointed peers,
respectively.”108 It is obviously corrosive to a system of criminal justice that your
sentence depends on the political party of your judge. If this is happening, or seems
to be happening, the impulse to maintain or increase regulatory control over
sentencing is liable to be irresistible.
The other engine behind bureaucratic regulation of sentencing is the
federalization of criminal law: the expansion in the number and reach of crimes on
the federal books.109 A federal Circuit Judge puts it this way:
Any long-term effort to respect the virtues of individualized
sentencing and consistency should account for the role that the
federalization of crime has played in creating the problem . . .
While Ohio has no obligation to sentence those who commit drug
offenses within its borders consistently with those who do the
same in North Dakota, Congress does have such an obligation.
Anyone interested in balancing consistency with individualized
sentencing ought to acknowledge that the task is harder for the
Federal Government than for a State, and ought to keep that in
mind each time someone proposes federalizing a new area of
crime.110
So long as federal criminal jurisdiction continues to grow, the desire to
monitor and control the sentencing discretion of the judges is likely to remain
strong.111

107. See William K. Sessions III, At the Crossroads of the Three Branches: The U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Reform in the Midst of Inter-Branch Power Struggles, 26
J.L. & POL. 305, 346–50 (2011).
108. Yang, supra note 8, at 1277.
109. See generally Alex Kozinski & Misha Tseytlin, You’re (Probably) a Federal Criminal, in IN THE
NAME OF JUSTICE 43 (Timothy Lynch ed., 2009) (discussing the proliferation of federal criminal
offenses).
110. Jeffrey S. Sutton, An Appellate Perspective on Federal Sentencing After Booker and Rita, 85
DENV. U. L. REV. 79, 91 (2007).
111. See generally William H. Pryor Jr., Federalism and Sentencing Reform in the PostBlakely/Booker Era, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 515, 524–30 (2011) (concurring with Sixth Circuit colleague
Jeffrey Sutton, see supra note 110, that creating too many federal crimes leads to pressure for excessive
regulation of federal sentencing).
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Whether those on the liberal or progressive Left who supported sentencing
reform and a Guidelines regime, out of fear of judicial bias and over-harsh
sentencing, have any reason to be pleased with the results up to now under the
Guidelines is, to put it as gently as possible, uncertain. The trend toward more severe
sentencing under the Guidelines, as well as under state laws in recent decades, surely
had a disproportionate effect on black communities. An economists’ study notes that
“arrest rates for blacks have been at least four times greater than arrest rates for
whites for decades. Thus, the shift to more punitive treatment for offenders had a
much larger effect on the levels of incarceration rates among blacks than among
whites.”112 It might be responded that minority communities suffer
disproportionately from crime, and that more rigorous sentencing represents an effort
to protect vulnerable and law-abiding people in minority communities. It is unlikely,
however, that Senator Kennedy and left-leaning supporters of sentencing reform
would have taken that view. Those on the Right, on the other hand, who supported
the Sentencing Reform Act and the Guidelines in order to stiffen criminal sentencing
in the federal courts did – it can fairly be said —largely and at least for a time achieve
their goal.
____________________________

112. Neal & Rick, supra note 7, at 4–5.

